Potomac Pals: How The friendship of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison led to A National Capitol in the Chesapeake
Potomac Pals: How The friendship of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison led to A National Capitol in the
Chesapeake
In the 1780s, a friendship formed that would
physically, politically, economically, and spiritually change the United States.
Few teams can claim the successes of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, who,
together, worked on the construction of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, the
Residency and Assumption Bills, and eventually the Louisiana Purchase. To say
that these achievements are just the tip of the iceberg is an understatement.
To provide an inclusive view into all of these men's accomplishments would
require a book unto itself. Therefore, rather than focusing on these two
founding fathers' myriad successes, this essay seeks to expand further the
mechanism that enabled one of history's' most prolific political partnerships.
At once, representatives of Virginia, and members of the Virginia gentry, the
two men found one another amid mutual personal tragedies that had left them
reeling for intimate disclosure.[1] As
they helped one another heal, the lingering question of how best to heal those
national wounds preventing the formation of a perfect union came to the fore, guiding
the pair toward their intertwined political legacies. As the younger, shorter,
and less assertive of the two, Madison began his career in Jefferson's shadow,
only stepping out once the lessons of independence and political diplomacy had
been thoroughly vetted during his own presidency.[2]
Thus, when The Compromise of 1790 was reached, Madison was still under
Jefferson's tutelage, his actions guided explicitly by his charismatic mentor's
will.
When considering
the best possible alignment for burgeoning democracies, the need to produce a
centralized, non-eccentric, capital residence is primary. At least this was the
argument that Madison made in his speech to the First Congress when he
advocated for the Potomac as the nation's permanent capital.[3] In
defense of this view, Madison cites states which have formed with their
capitals located along the periphery, rather than the core, such as North
Carolina, New York, South Carolina, Delaware, alongside the joint civilian
efforts to attain a centralized capital in the aftermath of such incongruent
formations.[4] In Madison's view, central
seats of power in a state or nation produced political balance due to the equal
access that such a location provided to all representatives of the states across
the nation. As such, he argued, the Potomac existed as the sole central seat of
the United States, equally accessible by all.[5] However,
the significance of an equally
accessible government was not a solely Madisonian invention. It has long
existed as a flywheel in Jefferson's argument for the societal balance.[6]
In his view, the theoretical "few" non-producers that would have
access to a capital located in the Northern (conservative) vector of the United
States were trumped by the "many" working-class people of the United
States' Central/Southern (liberal) vector.[7]
While the speech that Madison gave to First Congress in September of 1789 was given
in his own terminology, the significance of "central" vs. "eccentric"
capital locations resulted from a Madisonian interpretation of the conceptual more
perfect union that Jefferson crafted during his five years of
correspondence with various leading men of the United States, whilst serving as
an ambassador in Paris (1784-1790).[8]
[9]
In addition to the centrality issue, any possibility
of a future Jefferson presidency would require Madison to take up the Residence
argument himself, knowing that a credible campaign could only occur if
Jefferson himself were aloof or unaware of current party members' partisan
ambitions.[10] Campaigning openly for
political office was seen as a weakness of candidacy, akin to personal
manipulation, and thus, a significant detractor for early presidential candidates.[11] Madison's
intermediary role in the Compromise of 1790 would serve as one of the greatest
political lessons of his Jeffersonian tutelage, forcing him to resume public
debate in Congress and embrace the inevitable criticisms that came with arguing
for the Potomac Promise.[12] [13]
Despite his public absence regarding the
Residence question, in private, Jefferson craftily influenced the
pro-Virginia/pro-Republican mindset by employing his allies' aid.[14]
However, Jefferson's own poetic language about Virginia ultimately bleeds
through his constituents' words, pushing the Periclean eloquence of the Virginian
to the forefront.[15]
The "General" and "Generalissimo" relationship that Jefferson
shared with Madison was a common trope of the distinctly Jeffersonian style of politicking
that he had developed during his trans-Atlantic correspondence (and indeed, he
had a nearly identical relationship with the young congressman James Monroe).[16] While
bolstering his young mentee with Enlightenment-era discourses from intellectuals
like David Hume and Montesquieu, he simultaneously tasked Madison with various
tasks that utilized the diminutive Virginian's penchant for socio-political
policy construction.[17]
In effect, Jefferson was much more of a political rhetorician than a political
lawmaker, and thus, the implementation of his intricate ideological designs
required an erudite and meticulous mind.[18]
That the Potomac river system would function
as one of the most revealing aspects of their relationship is not accidental.
Jefferson had focused on developing the region for years, fully aware of the
commercial and industrial implications attached to such a development.[19]
The fact that Monticello sits only 35 kilometers to the Northeast of the Potomac
is challenging to ignore, especially when considering that Jefferson, thanks to
Madison, had made significant inroads toward a lucrative land acquisition that encompassed
the best acreage the region had to offer.[20]
Such a land deal would see the Potomac River System vaulted into the financial
stratosphere as freshly manufactured goods traveled south from Pennsylvania,
Ohio, Delaware, Maryland, and beyond, into an economically centralized location
that provided the best possible junction point for a continentally
interconnected riverine distribution system.[21] Such
profitability helps explain why the Pennsylvania-Virginia alliance existed before
the Compromise of 1790, as many landowners saw the potential for financial
windfalls if the Residency Bill were to pass.[22]
It also explains why describing the Residency Bill as a political
accomplishment that originated with Madison is erroneous.
Madison made the argument for the Potomac as
a viable national capital by citing its position as a central hub for the
interchange of state representatives. However, upon further consideration, it
is apparent that such centrality only mattered due to the concentrated population
in the region. Despite having better-developed harbors, shipping lanes, and a
thriving population base through which economic interactions could proliferate,
Madison never saw Pennsylvania as an equitable option for the national capital.[23] However, the installation of a temporary
capital in Philadelphia proved to be fully compatible with the national
government's needs. In many ways, it was better positioned than the Potomac
thanks to the prolific array of politicians, diplomats, and higher educational
establishments that had already developed in the region.[24]
By contrast, the Potomac River Basin was a hinterland with no major cities to
speak of. In truth, the Potomac's most attractive aspect as a sight for the
national capital was not its economic or political centrality, but rather, the
Potomac's position of centrality relative to the United States' formative
politicians.[25] Of the first five
presidents, four lived in Virginia: Washington, Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe.
Up to this point, Jefferson's influence over
Madison has been represented as a type of disciple-Teacher relationship; however,
there was a deeply personal side to the alliance these men shared.[26]
Following the death of his wife, Martha, it was Madison whom Jefferson sought
out. Prior to her death, Jefferson and Madison's correspondence had mainly been
deferential, with Madison accepting directives from Jefferson in the typical
educator-student dynamic.[27]
As mentioned, various books and treatises that Jefferson sent to Madison during
his tenure as an American ambassador in France were critical in shaping Madison's
already staggering body of cumulative intelligence. (The writings of David Hume
and Montesquieu wholly consumed Madison).[28]
However, the educator-student relationship is a formal one, wherein both sides
agree to play a role: one as the director and the other as the subordinate.
On the other hand, friendships have no
definite form or balance, and anthropologists' repeated efforts to nail down
the dynamic nature of non-kinship-based mutualism have proven to be confounding.[29]
Ultimately, the best definition of friendship remains that of interpersonal interaction
characterized by empathy and teamwork. While the "teamwork" aspect of
their relationship had been apparent from the start (with Madison repeatedly
referred to as Jefferson's right-hand by First Congress), the empathetic
connection the men shared is more difficult to discern. It is in the tender
moments, such as the nights that Madison and Jefferson shared in a boarding
house as the latter dealt with the death of his wife during childbirth, that
the genuine commitment of their friendship surfaces.[30] Still,
these details are not left to be found by the casual observer; Jefferson's
obsession with his intimates' secrecy saw to that.[31]
Ferreting out a secret friendship is made
more difficult, but all the more apparent, when the two men under investigation
exchange ciphered correspondences that have never seen the light of day. As
records show, the cipher was specific to Jefferson and Madison and never
decoded.[32] While political
expedience could also create the need for a ciphered script, the generic tracts
that Madison and Jefferson produced for the record books suggest that the
content of those private letters was anything but formal.[33]
There are times when their brotherhood's depths pushed through the generic
descriptions of French diplomatic proceedings and seemingly impenetrable bodies
of data that Madison composed regarding the Constitutional Convention. Most
notably, the men's letters' salutations and farewells often carry vivid
displays of respect and reverence. Jefferson closes out an outgoing letter from
France in August of 1789 with the phrase: "I am with great & sincere
esteem, Dr. Sir, your affectionate friend, and servant."[34] In
contrast, a correspondence between Jefferson and General Henry Lee of Virginia,
who was also a key player in the Potomac deal, closes with the phrase: "I
have the honor with very great esteem Dear Sir to be your most obedient, and
most humble servant."[35] Though
Jefferson always cared to be respectful in his varied correspondence, he did
not throw around informal terms like "affectionate friend" lightly.
In truth, many of his letters bear the distinct flair of formal distance that
Jefferson maintained for the entirety of his political career.
Salutations aside, the most substantial evidence
for the influence these two men's friendship had upon the Residency issue lies
in Jefferson's willingness to allow Madison to provide him with political
insights.[36] At 6'2" Jefferson
was eight inches taller than Madison, and with eight years of age on his young
friend, with charisma and clarity of speech and thought that had launched him
into the national spotlight following the release of his Declaration of
Independence, it is not difficult to imagine why Madison would have deferred to
Jefferson[37]. Having first began their
work together in 1779, by 1790, the pair had been companions for over a decade
when the Residency issue came to a head. That decade had stripped both men of
their former best friends, leaving them isolated and unproductive, only to then
bring the two together in a new and spectacular comradery.[38]
Ideologue and tactician, the two grew to complement one another so well that
very few could tell where Jefferson stopped and Madison started, a closeness
that could only be possible with mutual input.[39] Madison
ultimately reeled in Jefferson's broader ideals, even going as far as to disagree
openly, or averting entirely, Jefferson's opinions concerning the Constitution's
construction.[40] While some of the
information Madison withheld was due to the imposition of a secrecy clause by
the Constitutional Convention, much of what was unsaid resulted from
disagreements the two held concerning the very nature of individual freedom.[41]
This disagreement highlights one of the strangest and most fascinating aspects
of The Jefferson-Madison friendship: Madison's endorsement of
Jeffersonian/Republican concepts in the formative stage of political ideology
and his support of a broad, central authority in the voting phase.
Madison's independent streak became even
more pronounced during his presidency, which saw the man tear himself in two as
he tried to straddle his Jeffersonian aspirations with his innately authoritarian
pragmatism. However, in 1790, their political alliance was running full steam
ahead with fluid efficiency. Such efficacy
is on full display in the aforementioned correspondences with General Henry Lee
and Madison, who organized the logistical implementation of a Potomac capital,
stateside. Furthermore, Madison met with Senator Robert Morris of Pennsylvania
in late-1789 to reaffirm the validity of the Pennsylvania-Virginia Alliance,
this time ensuring that bill would pass by allowing the question of Assumption
to erode congressional confidence in Federalism enough to force provisions with
steep concessions.[42]
In truth, this alliance had attempted to secure the site the year prior but had
failed when the Pennsylvania congressmen backtracked on their earlier claims to
support a Potomac capital.[43]
To be sure, none of the men felt that the same fate would befall the Residency
Bill a second time, a fact that was supported by the auspice to sell off
acreage in the newly minted capital zone to European interests, such as the
prestigious Dupont family of France: (close friends of Jefferson, and by
extension Madison).[44]
Despite the development of powerful alliances
and friendships in France, Jefferson claimed deniability on the Residence issue
well after the bill had come to pass, all while fostering the hopes of French
business people, like Samuel Pierre Dupont, that saw the western front of
Virginia as the most lucrative economic gold rush in development.[45] As mentioned, Jefferson was not the only Virginian
who saw personal profits in securing the Potomac as a national center of
industry. After all, the "Petomek," (Algonquin for "trading
place") as the native peoples referred to it, had led John Smith to
proclaim similar dreams of grandeur for the Chesapeake.[46] In
1784, Jefferson wrote to Madison from France, urging him to take up residence
in "the neighborhood of Monticello," alongside Monroe and Short.[47]
Washington's Mt. Vernon residence already abutted the prospective capital
property line. And, since the days of Revolution, he and Jefferson had been
discussing making the various river systems that tied into the Potomac
navigable to better business and communication potentiality in the region.[48]
Fortuitously, the business of
surveying the Potomac region fell to Jefferson and Madison following the
passage of the Residence Bill in 1790.[49]
The bill itself specifically stated that Washington (as President) was to
commission two surveyors to the Potomac to determine the best possible location
and then allocate funds to purchase the land.[50]
As seen, the commission was purely superficial, as Madison and Lee had completed
much of the process the year before. The question of why two commissioners
were required for a surveying project that was, in essence, already complete
can only be answered by concluding that the entire construction and
implementation of the Residency Bill was an aesthetic veneer concealing
back-room gerrymandering that dated back to the earliest discussions of the
ever-illusive more-perfect-union.
While some questions can be answered, others
remain, necessarily, quizzical. Why did Madison, a mousy and introverted
scholar, take on the advocacy of a controversial bill that saw him ridiculed
openly for the first time in his career? Madison's abandonment of lifelong
personal subversion tactics to take the fight of Residency head-on reflects an
external impetus and one that must have been incredibly compelling and
authoritative. Studying Madison produces a somewhat stupefying effect in even the
most particular scholars due to the way that Jefferson ends up overshadowing
the research. That is not to say that Jefferson significantly influenced
Madison's politics in the early phase of his career: that is well known.[51] It
is to say that Jefferson dominated the mind and heart of Madison in this phase
of his life. After all, Madison's own failed romance with Catherine "Kitty"
Ford is only known about because of his discussions with Jefferson.[52]
It is almost as if Madison, himself, lacks the confidence necessary to embrace
his own personality, and as so many young men do when faced with this
incongruency, He followed the man who embodied his thoughts and expressions in ways
he could only dream of.
James Madison's close personal ties with
Thomas Jefferson compelled him to lead the charge on the Residence Argument to
cement the Potomac as the nation's capital: a choice deeply influenced by
Jefferson's personal views of Virginia as the leaders-exemplar' in creating a "more
perfect union" than had ever existed.[53] These
close ties also produced one of the most alluring and productive friendships in
the United States' Revolutionary period. At once intimate friends and tactical
allies, when Jefferson and Madison worked in unison, the results were
far-reaching and, at times, rubbed elbows with Providence. It is easy to lose
sight of the people the Founding Fathers were when observing the earth-moving
changes their political ideas produced, but beneath the wigs and wool coats,
these men were still humans; humans who dealt with the loss of loved ones,
compromised physical health, and the pain of public insult so often suffered in
the line of diplomatic duty. Madison's dedication to Jefferson and his
dedication to the state that had birthed a nation both represent emotional battles
that drew the introverted Madison out of his shell and into the political fray.
It becomes clear that while the mentor-mentee relationship eventually
transitioned into mutual respect, Jefferson's importance to Madison was that
the former gave the latter confidence to be himself and fight for what he believed
in publicly. In return, Madison taught Jefferson how to compel his allies to
take on complex and daunting tasks, thus imparting the most critical lesson to
becoming a great leader: capitalizing on personal influence.
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