Pedal to the Metal
Pedal to the Metal:
The Meteoric Rise of Vehicular Fatalities in the United States
During the 1920s
J.M.
Rogers
The
1920s were a time of historical paradigm shifts that dramatically changed how
Americans interacted with each other and the world. As suffrage ended, long-held
views of gender comportment decayed, revealing a budding need for co-ed
engagement and individual expression. Families that had once spent their
evenings in sleepy inactivity now found their rituals disturbed. Daughters, who
had formerly been stashed away like fine China, took off with reckless abandon,
eager to show that their long-fabled fragility was greatly exaggerated.
American nightlife expanded rapidly during The Flapper Revolution, and for the
first time in U.S. history, masses of single women packed into speakeasies and
local taverns alongside their male counterparts.[1]
Similarly,
the men of the 1920s found themselves in the midst of a societal shift, one
that saw their market value diminishing in the face of new workplace
competition and a war-less world. As men delved deeper into themselves to
grapple with the stresses of business and the persistent horrors that so
frequently accompanied post-war warriors, many found escape in libation and
merrymaking.[2] As
the warriors and flappers found one another beneath the stars, American culture
became as nocturnal as it was diurnal, producing a lucrative economic
potentiality for American manufacturers and consumers. Amidst all these rapid
changes, the automobile plodded up and down the streets, enabling the very nighttime
migrations that would usher America into the Jazz Age and the Era of Automotive
Atrocities.[3]
This research project is not intended to
provide a fully inclusive view of the myriad factors that led to the
accelerated rise of auto-related deaths during the period from 1920-1929, but
rather to provide a glimpse, from a distance, into the deadly world of personal
automotive transportation in the 20s. As with many new technologies, the
commercial and political interests at play dramatically alter the nature of manufacture
and distribution, but such interests will only be referenced broadly in this study.
The need to detail various flaws in automotive conceptualization, which led to
increases in vehicular death, is inseparable from this project’s aims. However,
this paper is not an exhaustive study of automotive defect any more than it is
intended to be a quantitative assessment of specific accident types’
catastrophic results.
So, why did vehicular fatalities
rise so rapidly in the 1920s? Evidence suggests that the rise of auto-related
death in the 20s was due to the nation’s inability to adapt to novel automotive
advancements that rendered former modalities of transportation-related thought
obsolete. Occurring against the backdrop of dramatic cultural change and
economic growth, the introduction of automobiles that could exceed speeds of 70
mph (like the Chrysler 70 and Ford Model-A) dramatically altered highway
safety. Bundling such unparalleled acceleration with an often-reckless
nightlife, an ignorant public, and a lack of adequately developed road systems
resulted in a disastrous recipe of high-speed death, horrific injury, and
involuntary manslaughter.
Nation-wide,
automobile ownership skyrocketed in the 20s, primarily due to rising inflation
rates and the affordability of motor vehicles. In 1926, the cost of a new
Chrysler “70” ranged from $1395-$1795.[4]
These vehicles would still be relatively cost-effective in today’s market, with
price tags of $20,300.00 and $26,120.00,
respectively.[5]
Such low prices were made possible by the scores of independent manufacturers
clamoring to produce their distinct brand of fortune-yielding automobiles. Many
of them retrofitted factories and engineering concepts that had produced tanks
and materiéle just a few years prior, leading to bulky automobiles with
“military” front ends and “cadet visors” that were both callbacks to U.S.
prowess in World War I.[6]
The
Auburn Automotive company was one such independent, whose specialty in
manufacturing “Pleasure Makers” centered on their artisan-level craftsmanship.[7]
Like a Rolls-Royce, these Indiana cars were made of steel, with hand-sewn
leather seats, wood grain interior panels, metallically painted fenders, and
double-inspected engines. They were sleek machines, closer to Great War tanks
than modern automobiles, and designed for stylish upper-class joyriding. Body
designs were based around rigid steel chassis and thick steel panels that would
do well to stop non-armor piercing ammo; however, the efficacy of such safety
measures within the theater of high-speed collisions was untested.[8]
In general, most assumed that steel’s tensile strength would translate to human
safety. The rapid rise of vehicular deaths throughout the decade would
challenge this belief to its very core.
It
is telling that Auburn Automotive chose to emphasize their cars’ hand-made
quality, stressing the attention paid to every minute detail capable of
improving performance, without ever mentioning driver safety.[9]
Presented with powerful new engines that could push speeds of 75 mph, neither
the government nor the American public was prepared for the dangers that such accelerated
technology presented. As a result, in 1921, automobile accidents produced 13,253
fatalities, approximately 126.30 deaths per 100,00 vehicles registered in the
United States.[10] The
National Bureau of Casualty and Surety Underwriters estimated that this total
amounted to one auto-related death every 42 minutes in the United States. [11]
By 1929, the number of vehicular fatalities increased by 78% to reach 29,592.[12]
While some states made modest efforts to
improve highway safety, such as reducing dangerous curves, the lack of a
coordinated national program meant improvements were sporadic or non-existent.[13]
Statistical Bulletins from Metro Life Insurance reveal just how
disturbed the company chairman was by the troubling rise of statistical death
rates among their 15 million customers involved in automotive accidents.[14]
For the chairman, the United States’ collective inability to react to these
ballooning deaths seemed equivalent to neglecting a malaria outbreak.[15]
Newspaper articles from across the country mirrored the chairman’s worries,
expressing astonishment and outrage over the mounting glut of automotive deaths.[16]
Despite the public outcry, automobile manufacturers, like Stearns-Knight,
continued unwaveringly in their traditional pursuits of supreme “riding comfort,”
“strength of body,” and stylistic distinction.[17]
In
just four weeks in 1927, 530 deaths were reported from 77 reporting cities. Seven
thousand two hundred six total deaths occurred from May 21, 1927 – May 21, 1928,
in those same cities, tallying close to 100 people per city. [18] These results were not isolated events.
National vehicular fatalities topped 24,000 for the first time in 1927,
amounting to a per capita death rate of 20.56. 1927 was also the first year in
U.S. records that per capita vehicular fatalities increased beyond 20, an
upward trend that would continue throughout the final two years of the decade.
The
public outcry over rising death tolls was substantial; however, rather than
producing safety reforms in automotive production, the outcry produced a bitter
decades-long national debate over culpability for vehicular fatalities between
citizen-consumers and citizen-manufacturers. Many experts-in-the-field (as they
were called) pointed the finger at foolish pedestrians and poorly disciplined
drivers, despite half of all auto-related deaths being children (half of whom
were maimed while crossing roadways).[19]
As a result, nationwide, auto manufacturers resisted demands to expand on any “relatively
unimportant mechanical aids to safety.” [20]
Beyond the rearview mirror, the side mirror, the brake light, and four-disc
brakes, manufacturers viewed further additions of safety devices as nothing
more than a costly expense. The industry defended its intransigence toward reform
by echoing their experts and insisting that “four out of five deaths” were human
error rather than faulty machinery.[21]
Such metrics helped diffuse legal blame for accidents and the financial
responsibility of providing public education programs that would enlighten new
drivers and pedestrians, most of whom had only an intuitive understanding of driving
risks.
Unsurprisingly, auto-related
fatalities continued to rise alongside expanding automobile ownership.[22]
Congested highways made the enforcement of driving reforms challenging and road
improvements sluggish, with total public roads increasing by merely 167,000
miles (or 3%) between 1920-1929.[23]
Such efforts to decongest roadways experiencing a 32% increase in annual travel
over the same period were woefully inconsistent with public needs. Besides
having too little available mileage for safe travel, rural areas lagged far
behind cities in roadway lighting and roadway quality.[24]
Night
driving proved to be the most dangerous experience for many drivers, as they
plunged down pitch-black back roads at high speed with military-grade
spotlights blazing a white path into the dark beyond. Companies like GE and
Westinghouse held virtual monopolies over the electrical aspects of automotive
production. Since 1922 their research and development arm, Illuminating
Engineering Laboratories, had mandated uniform headlight standards for the
industry.[25]
Relying on a single beam of intense light, drivers effectively blinded one
another when they crossed paths after sundown. By 1926, Illuminating
Engineering Laboratories realized the need for dimming bulbs that utilized two
filaments, rather than one, and a headlight that projected light vertically, rather
than only horizontally. However, even with evidence that manufacturer errors
had led to increases in nighttime automotive accidents, GE maintained that
roadways lacking sufficient lighting were the cause of these accidents, not
their patents. In their view, the headlights themselves only marginally
contributed to nighttime driving’s adverse outcomes, while human error, once
again, persisted as the most significant contributor to vehicular deaths.[26]
A minority sought specific reforms
to automotive production standards, such as regulating headlight placement and
motor mounting heights.[27]
However, by and large, society seemed incapable of deciding who was responsible
for curbing the untimely disappearances of children, police officers, road workers,
and gifted pianists.[28]
In May of 1927, the owner of Tung-Sol Lampworks, Harvey Harper, began paying
newspapers out-of-pocket to promote a national ad campaign detailing the
importance of headlight positioning in limiting nighttime automobile accidents.
Harper, a veteran of legal battles with the corporate juggernauts of GE and
Westinghouse, was well aware of the dangers that existing headlight models
created. His prototype lamp design called for a double-filament, and his
company provided detailed information about the proper adjustment of his
particular headlights to prevent glare.[29]
Rather than simply leaving the drivers of the world to their luck and
intuition, Harvey, and Tung-Sol Lampworks, provided guidance and engaged the
public directly on the subject of nighttime driving safety. Still, cases such
as Harper’s were too few and too underpowered to produce a dramatic change in
national automotive deaths or national opinions concerning their causes.
Between 1920-1929, there were
200,124 vehicular fatalities in the United States. These deaths represent a 13%
increase in per capita death during the same period, as deaths rose from 11.42
per hundred thousand to 24.30.[30]
According to Metro Life Insurance’s statistical model, that means that
approximately 100,062 of these deaths were children. For perspective, the total U.S. deaths in The
Great War were 117,000, with 50,280 killed in combat and an additional 57,000
dying from the Spanish Flu. While Great War and Spanish Flu deaths were higher
in per capita death rates per year, the importance of the comparison lies in
the fact that those deaths were largely unavoidable.[31]
War and disease may have cursed humanity since primordial times, but as the
decade following WW1 and the most significant modern pandemic showed, vehicular
death represented a fifth horseman, whose steed had blinding speed and
devastating killing power. When weighed against the total population, more
Americans were killed by automobiles in the 1920s than in any other decade in
U.S. history. By utilizing, again, the sobering metric employed by the Metro
Life Insurance Company, these 200,124 vehicular fatalities equated to one death
every 26 minutes throughout the decade. That equates to approximately two-and-a
third deaths per hour at a time when only eleven million, or nine percent, of
Americans, were registered vehicle owners. Still, these deaths do not relay
total automotive deaths. All fatal collisions involving trolley cars or trains
were either categorized as a train or trolley fatality, not vehicular, thus
keeping the total death figures for this period artificially low.[32]
The
data presented brings the words of the worried Metro Life Insurance chairman
back to the fore:
If
the country were confronted with a pandemic of smallpox, or of typhoid , or of
malaria, public health officials would immediately concentrate on measures to
counteract its spread. And public health officials would hardly take the ground
that the situation did not demand more and more attention because of an
increase in the number of opportunities for infection! So in relation to
automobile accidents, we can find no comfort in the fact that there are more
machines. A way must be found which will safeguard human life irrespective of
whether more or less automobiles use the highways of the country.[33]
Unfortunately, the
chairman’s outcry over these seemingly invisible deaths, much like the cries of
so many heartbroken widowers and parents, fell upon the ears of those who had
little power to change the circumstances. Improved safety technologies, like
seat belts, turn signals, positraction, anti-lock brakes, and airbags, were, at
this time, still figments of science fiction. In both dollars and human
resources, the cost required for enhancing, expanding, and improving the national
public roadways was prohibitively immense. Even with overwhelming statistical
data supporting the reform of automotive safety, highway safety, and the
expansion of public information campaigns to help combat a dangerous lack of driver/pedestrian
awareness, vehicular fatalities would only slowly decline over the coming
decades. Ultimately, reforms to policy and safety matter little if the drivers
themselves take little heed. Tempted by eye-catching ads, swanky new styles,
and the lure of technological novelty, the number of drivers on U.S. roads only
increased after the automotive boom of the 20s.[34]
As a result of these compounding issues, from 1920 until the beginning of World
War 2, the United States, alone, recorded over half a million (525,673)
vehicular fatalities.[35]
The
1920s were a decade that witnessed the United States in a phase of multi-layered
expansion. As markets swelled to keep pace with inflationary growth, the
culture of America’s youth diverged from practical conventions that had long
defined the Antebellum era. In step with these expansive social shifts were the
engineers, scientists, and wily innovators who sought to capitalize on the
new-found glut of speculatory investment, both commercially and culturally. As
has often been the case in American history, the impetus to embrace the future
precedes a fine-grain understanding of the various challenges and failures that
such a future might entail. Fewer examples display this ad-hoc style of social
growth better than the automotive industry in the second decade of the 20th
century. By the end of the 1920s, automobiles were no longer a novel concept
but a budding commonality that a majority of American families enjoyed and
interacted with daily. However, due to the combined pressures of industrial
resistance to reform and societal ignorance toward the destructive potential of
high-speed automobiles, the 20s became a decade of automotive butchery that revealed
the dangers of nascent technology in the hands of callow consumers.
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Allen, Frederick. Only
Yesterday: An Informal History of the 1920s in America. New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1931,
92-100.
“AUTO HEADLIGHTS
NEED MORE AREA: Glaring and Dimming are Serious Menace to Safety
in Nighttime Driving- Advises Use of Two-Filament Lamps.” New York
Times, March 14, 1926.
“Automobile Deaths
Exceed 1927 Total: 530 Deaths are Reported in 77 Cities in Four Weeks – Nine
of Them had None.” New York Times, June 24, 1928.
“Automobile Death
Total 12,500 in 1921: One Person Killed Every 42 Minutes Says National Risk
Bureau: Total Injured is 300,000.” New York Times, July 1, 1922.
Dollar Times. Last modified , 2021. https://www.dollartimes.com/inflation/.
“ELECTRIC LAMP
MONOPOLY CHARGED: General Electric and Westinghouse Said to Sell 95% Of Bulbs in America. COMPETITION CHOKED
OFF Lockwood Witness Tells How
He Was Forced to Sell Out--Untermyer Charges Extortion. Capital, $230,000; Profits, $325,000 How Prices Were
Fixed. Durant Sold $300 Stock at $181. Methods of Attacking His Business. To Make a Show of Competition. Says
Competition Was Throttled.
Company Denies Monopoly.,” New York Times, January 7, 1922.
“Glaring Lights on
Automobiles Serious Menace: Correct Focus of Lights Urged by Tung-Sol Firm.”
Pensacola News Journal, May 22, 1927.
Making Pleasure
Makers. United States:
Auburn Automobile Company, 1927. Film. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pEOw6n1OOh8&t=388s
“Maryland Reduces Dangerous
Curves: Nearly 100 Have Been Made Less Hazardous in Last Few Years by
Widening.” Washington D.C. Evening Star, December 5, 1926.
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and Peter Maslowski. For the Common Defense. New York: The Free
Press, 1984.
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Man and 2 Women: George Westry, Pianist, Dies as Result of Automobile Accident
in November.” New York Times, February 2, 1924.
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Deaths.” Washington Times, December 22, 1922.
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“The New
Stearns-Knight Offers New Distinctions in Coachwork and Fittings With the
Famous
Motor Acclaimed at Recent London and Paris Salons.” Washington D.C. Evening
Star, December 5, 1926.
“The Newer, Finer,
Chrysler-70.” Washington D.C. Evening Star, December 5, 1926.
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“Uniform
Headlights for Motor Cars.” New York Times, December 10, 1922.
[1] Allen, Frederick. Only
Yesterday: An Informal History of the 1920s in America. New York: Harper
and Row Publishers, 1931, 92-94.
[2]
Allen, Frederick, 94-95.
[3]
Allen, Frederick, 99-100.
[4]
"The Newer, Finer, Chrysler-70." Washington D.C. Evening Star,
December 5, 1926.
[5]
Dollar Times. Last modified, 2021. https://www.dollartimes.com/inflation/.
[7]
Making Pleasure
Makers.
United States: Auburn Automobile Company, 1927. Film. 3:36-6:50.
[8]
Making Pleasure Makers, 4:00-10:16.
[9]
Making Pleasure Makers, 1:00-10:16.
[10]
"Motor Vehicle Traffic Fatalities, 1900-2007.
National Summary. Table FI-200." U.S. Department of Transportation,
Federal Highway Administration. Last modified January, 2009.
[11]
"Automobile Death Total 12,500 in 1921: One Person Killed Every 42 Minutes
Says National Risk Bureau: Total Injured is 300,000." New York
Times, July 1, 1922.
[12]
"Motor Vehicle Traffic Fatalities, 1900-2007.
National Summary. Table FI-200." U.S. Department of Transportation,
Federal Highway Administration.
[13]
"Maryland Reduces Dangerous Curves: Nearly 100 Have
Been Made Less Hazardous in Last Few Years by Widening." Washington
D.C. Evening Star, December 5, 1926.
[16]
"MOTORCARS KILL MAN AND 2 WOMEN: George Westry, Pianist, Dies as Result of
Automobile Accident in November. NATIONAL HIGHWAY REPORT January Automobile
Deaths Were 174, an Increase of 101 Over January 1923.,” New York Times.
February, 2 1924.
[17]
"The New Stearns-Knight Offers New Distinctions in Coachwork and Fittings
With the Famous Motor Acclaimed at Recent London and Paris Salons.”
Washington D.C. Evening Star, December 5, 1926.
[18]
"Automobile Deaths Exceed 1927 Total: 530 Deaths are Reported in 77 Cities
in Four Weeks – Nine of Them had None." New York Times, June
24, 1928.
[19]
“Motors Cause Few Deaths.” Washington Times, December 22, 1922; Statistical
Bulletin. 1st ed. Vol. 1. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 1920, 28.
[20]
Rich, Stephen G. "Automobile Safety Devices." New York Times,
May 1, 1925; "Motor Vehicle Traffic Fatalities, 1900-2007. National
Summary. Table FI-200." U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway
Administration.
[21]
Rich, Stephen G. "Automobile Safety Devices." New York Times,
May 1, 1925.
[22]
Statistical Bulletin. 4th ed.
Vol. 3., Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 1923, 1.
[23]
"Motor Vehicle Traffic Fatalities, 1900-2007. National Summary. Table
FI-200." U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway
Administration.
[24]
"AUTO HEADLIGHTS NEED MORE AREA: Glaring and Dimming are Serious Menace to
Safety in Nighttime Driving- Advises Use of Two-Filament Lamps." New
York Times, March 14, 1926.
[25]
“ELECTRIC LAMP MONOPOLY CHARGED: General Electric and Westinghouse Said to
Sell 95% Of Bulbs in America. COMPETITION CHOKED OFF Lockwood Witness Tells How
He Was Forced to Sell Out--Untermyer Charges Extortion. Capital, $230,000; Profits,
$325,000 How Prices Were Fixed. Durant Sold $300 Stock at $181. Methods of
Attacking His Business. To Make a Show of Competition. Says Competition Was
Throttled. Company Denies Monopoly.,” New York Times, January 7, 1922; "Uniform
Headlights for Motor Cars." New York Times, December 10, 1922.
[26]
"AUTO HEADLIGHTS NEED MORE AREA: Glaring and Dimming are Serious Menace to
Safety in Nighttime Driving- Advises Use of Two-Filament Lamps." New
York Times, March 14, 1926.
[27]
"Uniform Headlights for Motor Cars." New York Times,
December 10, 1922.
[28]
"MOTORCARS KILL MAN AND 2 WOMEN: George Westry, Pianist, Dies as Result of
Automobile Accident in November. NATIONAL HIGHWAY REPORT January Automobile
Deaths Were 174, an Increase of 101 Over January 1923.,” New York Times.
February, 2 1924.
[29]
"Glaring Lights on Automobiles Serious Menace: Correct Focus of Lights
Urged by Tung-Sol Firm." Pensacola News Journal, May 22, 1927.
[30]
"Motor Vehicle Traffic Fatalities, 1900-2007. National Summary. Table
FI-200." U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway
Administration.
[32]
Statistical Bulletin. 6th ed. Vol. 1., Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company, 1925, 577.
[33]
Statistical Bulletin. 6th ed. Vol. 1., Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company, 1925, 514.
[34]
Statistical Bulletin. 6th ed. Vol. 1., Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company, 1925, 577.
[35]
"Motor Vehicle Traffic Fatalities and Fatality Rate:1899-2003."
National Archives.
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